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THE LOTUS; CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS
The Permanent Court of International Justice in September of
last year rendered an important decision' on a case which had
already attracted much attention.2 The case came before the
court under a special agreement signed at Geneva in 1927 by the
French and Turkish governments, submitting a question of juris-
diction which had arisen between them.
' The Case of the S. S. "Lotus," Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (1927) Series A, No. 10, Judgment No. 9.
2 See Beckett, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners (1927) BRITISH YEAR
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108, 109: "It is perhaps the first case which
has come before the Court in which the question for decision is a point of
general international law. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over

















In August, 1926, a collision occurred on the high seas between
the Boz-kourt and the Lotus, the former a Turkish and the latter
a French steamship. As a result of this collision the Turlish
ship sank, and eight Turldsh subjects were drowmed. Upon the
subsequent voluntary entrance into Constantinople of the French
ship, Lieutenant Demons, officer of the watch on the Lotus, was
arrested and put on trial by the Turkish authorities in accordance
with Turkish law. The French government alleged that the
Turkish court acted without jurisdiction. This the Turldsh
government denied, and the difference finally resulted in the
special agreement, referred to above, which took the form of two
questions.
1. Has Turkey in taldng jurisdiction acted in conflict with
principles of international law, and if so what principles?
2. Should the reply be in the affinmative what pecuniary
reparation is due Al. Demons, provided, according to the princi-
ples of international law, reparation should be made?
We are concerned only with the first question. On this point
the court held, 7 to 5, that Turkey had not so acted.3 In the
opinion of some members of the court this question involved
another. Was article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code 4 in contra-
vention of any principle of international law? 5 Although the
and are conflicting even in the matter of first principles, but international
precedent is rare and indecisive. Whatever the result of the case may be,
the judgment can hardly avoid being something of an event in the de-
velopment of international law."
3 Judge Moore's opinion, listed among the dissenting opinions, concurred
on this point.
4 Article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code, Law No. 765 of March 1, 192G.
See S. S. Lotus, supra note 1, at 14:
"Any foreigner who, apart from the cases contemplated by Article 4,
commits an offence abroad to the prejudice of Turkey or of a Turlish sub-
ject, for which offense Turkish law prescribes a penalty involving loss of
freedom for a minimum period of not less than one year, shall be punished
in accordance with the Turkish Penal Code provided that he is arrested
in Turkey. The penalty shall however be reduced by one third and instead
of the death penalty, twenty years of penal servitude shall be awarded."
5 Judge Moore insisted that since the proceedings of the Turkdsh court
were taken under the statute, the question of the international validity of
the act was before the court. He stated that the claim of Turkey of a
right to try and punish foreigners for acts committed in foreign countries
not only against Turkey but against Turkish citizens was contrary to the
principles of international law. He said at page 92:
" ... to assert that this right of jurisdiction covers acts done before
the arrival of the foreign subjects in the country is in reality to set up a
claim to concurrent jurisdiction with other States as to acts done vithin
them, and so to destroy the very principle of exclusive territorial juris-
diction.
" ... It is evident that this claim is at variance not only vith the prin-
ciple of the exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its own territory, but
also with the equally well-settled principle that a person visiting a foreign
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validity of this section of the Turkish Code was not raised by the
special agreement, it seems that the Turkish government in its
argument before the court based its claim to jurisdiction largely
on this section. It was evidently for this reason that Judge Moore
found it necessary to discuss and condemn the validity of such
a provision as violating the generally accepted theory of
territorial jurisdiction, especially in the light of the fact that
there are similar provisions in the Italian and Brazilian Codes.
The majority, however, held that while the prosecution was
instituted in pursuance of Turkish legislation, the special agree-
ment does not indicate what clause or clauses of that legislation
apply, and adds that no document was submitted to the court
indicating on what article of the Turkish Penal Code the prosecu-
tion was based. 6
The problems which confronted the court may be divided into
four sub-topics. The first involves the application of the
theory that a ship is part of the territory of the country of the
flag.
While for purposes of taxation, insurance, etc., a ship is un-
doubtedly regarded as a chattel, writers on international law
and courts have long regarded it as analogous to territory,T or at
least as having a quasi-territorial character for many purposes."
So when a crime is committed on the high seas, jurisdiction
over the wrongdoer is generally recognized to lie in the country
to which the ship belongs.9 (Where the crime actually occurred
country, far from radiating for his protection the jurisdiction of his own
country, falls under the dominion of the local law."
6 See S. S. Lotus, supra note 1, at 14, par. 5.
7 See WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1866) pt. 2, c. 5, § 106:
"He (Vattel) also considers the vessels of a nation on the high seas as
portions of its territory," but then adds, " ... jurisdiction which the nation
has over its public and private vessels on the high seas, is exclusive only
so far as respects offences against its own municipal law."8 See 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906) c. 5, § 174, p. 930: "It is
often stated that a ship on the high seas constitutes a part of the territory
of the nation whose flag it flies... In the legal sense, it means that a ship
on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation to
which, or to whose citizens, it belongs. The jurisdiction is quasi-territorial."
9 Reg. v. Anderson, 11 Cox C. C. 198 (1868) (conviction of defendant,
a citizen of the United States, for manslaughter committed on British ship,
when on tidal river in France, affirmed); Reg. v. Armstrong, 13 Cox. Cr.
C. 184 (1875)- (especially where the defendant is a British ship, although
the murder took place on an African tidal river). See Costa Rica Packet Case,
reported in 5 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS (1898) 4948-53, where an
award following a convention signed at the Hague in 1895, submitting for
arbitration a claim of Great Britain against the Netherlands, growing out
of the arrest and detention in Netherlands Indies of the master of a Brit-
ish ship for alleged theft of a native boat on the high seas gave a decision
in favor of Great Britain: ". . . on the high seas even merchant vessels
constitute detached portions of the territory of the state whose flag they
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in the instant case will be later considered.) Because in a series
of cases the country of the flag was allowed jurisdiction without
objection by other nations, a shorthand expression was evolved
for describing the situation. The ship was said to be part of
the territory of the country of the flag. This has resulted in
the drawing of a vicious circle in which some courts have been
caught, while others have tried to cut a way out to a more ac-
curate analytical understanding of the questions involved.lo One
half circle is formed by the statement that, since the country of
the flag has jurisdiction in regard to matters occurring on the
high seas, it is part of the territory of the country of the flag.
bear, and, consequently, are only justiciable of their respective national
authorities for acts committed on the high seas." See paper by Mr. Evarts,
See. of State, to Mr. Welsh, Minister to England, in 1 Moorx, op. cit. svp~a
note 8, at 932, 933, in the case of a British subject who, while on board
an American ship on the high seas killed an officer of the ship while the
vessel was on its way from New York to Calcutta where the British
Government took jurisdiction:
"No principle of public law is better understood... than that merchant
vessels on the high seas are under the jurisdiction of the nation to which
they belong, and that as to common crimes committed on such vessels
while on the high seas, the competent tribunals of the vessel's nation have
exclusive jurisdiction of the questions of trial and punishment of any per-
son thus accused of the commission of a crime against its municipal laws."
20 See the dissenting opinion of Amplett, J., in Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2
Ex. Div. 63, 118, 119 (1876): "Now according to the decision in I2. v.
Coombes (1 Lea Cr. C. 388) the crime must be, for the purpose of deter-
mining the venue, held to have been committed on the English ship where
the death occurred; but that doctrine, founded as it us upon a convenient
fiction, and binding no doubt upon a British subject, does not decide the
question before us, which is, whether a foreigner who committed the offence
while he was de facto outside the English territory, could be made amenable
to English law." See the dissenting opinion of Lindley, J., at 93, in refer-
ence to the contention that a merchant ship is part of the territory of the
country whose flag she bears:
"It is obvious that she is not so in point of fact, and it is easy to show
that the doctrine holds good to a very limited extent indeed. (Cites as
examples 1-Where foreign merchant ship enters ports, harbors, rivers
they become subject to English law. 2-Territoriality of foreign merchant
ship within three miles of another state does not exempt it or crew from
revenue or fishing laws of that state. 3--In war, territoriality of ship does
not subject it to capture when within three miles of neutral coast. 4-
In war, so-called territoriality of neutral ship does not exempt it from
invasion in search of contraband of war).... In all there cases the ter-
ritoriality of the ship becomes an unmeaning phrase, and care must be
taken not to be misled by it, and not to allow the general assertion that a
ship is part of the territory whose flag she bears to pars unchallenged,
and to be made the basis of a legal argument.
"When, indeed, a ship is out at sea.., it is right that those on board her
should be subject to the laws of the country whose flag she bears; for other-
wise they would be subject to no law at all. To this extent a ship may be
said to be part of the territory of the country of her flag."
Queen v. Keyn was later overruled by a statute passed for this purpose.
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The completing half lies in the deduction that since a ship
on the high seas is part of the territory of the country of the
flag, such country has exclusive jurisdiction in the case before
the court at any time or on any set of facts.
Both the writers of the majority decision and some of the
dissenting members of the court seem to fall into this error.
One senses so swift a shifting from the basis of fact description
to legal conclusion, that one is made to see that such a term
as territory, having within it at least the germ of the legal con-
clusion as to jurisdiction, is permitted to enter the picture be-
fore the reasons for and against granting jurisdiction on a new
set of facts have been thoroughly weighed.,
The second question for the court, intimately connected with
the first, is one of interpretation of jurisdiction under two sep-
arate and distinct territorial theories.12 Judge Moore in de-
scribing various theories of criminal jurisdiction divided the
actual territorial theory into two types, (1) subjective, which
he described as relating to offenses committed by persons other
than diplomatic officers in the territory, and (2) objective,
which he described as relating to offences committed within a
territory by a person outside.13 He gave as examples a shot fired
on one side of a boundary taking effect on the other, and an
infernal machine, a swindling letter, poisonous food, or counter-
feit money sent into a country by a person outside.
"'The principle that a man who outside of a country wilfully
puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the
place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal juris-
prudence of all countries... it was held (at common law) that
a man who erected a nuisance in one county which took effect
in another was criminally liable in the county in which the
injury was done.' "14
In the instant case the alleged negligent act of Lieutenant
Demons took place on a French ship on the high seas. The effect
resulted in the sinking of a Turkish ship with loss of life to
Turkish nationals. The real question for the court was whether
under these facts it can be deemed to have taken effect in or
on Turkish "territory" and whether Turkey could thus properly
-- Perhaps this is but another example of the human tendency to reify,
or "thingify" rights and other legal relations. See Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases for the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOUINAL 457,
476.
12 See Beckett, supra note 2. The writer there states that both "sub-
jective" and "objective" territorial jurisdiction are comprised within the
territorial theory as alternatives, and that each is a ground for jurisdiction
recognized in fact in the legal systems of all states and consequently recog-
nized by the law of nations.
13 See 2 Moonn, op. cit. supra note 8, § 202 p. 243.
14 Ibid. 244.
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assume jurisdiction.7 It may be worth noting that while a
majority of the judges follow the objective theory, several
judges, including Loder, Weiss and Nyhom, seem to accept the
subjective theory of territoriality in no uncertain terms.
The third sub-topic is the contribution which precedent has
to offer to the deciding of the instant case. There have been
a few cases, none of them recent, tried in national courts, which
might throw some light on the question before the court' But
there is no decision which might reasonably seem conclusive of
the case as presented to the International Court.
The fourth problem, which was inevitably bound up with the
decision, though not treated articulately by the members of the
court, lies in the development or expansion of the territorial
theory of criminal jurisdiction in "international law." A tend-
ency in international law to find "general" or "fundamental"
principles which shall in all cases determine what a particular
country or state "can" and "cannot" do, has formed the back-
ground of the territorial theoryY.7 This is not based to a sufficient
extent on observation of what has been done or upon a prophecy
of what the courts will do. While such a general theory may
guide the courts, the instant case exemplifies the fact that the
general theory is capable of expansion and change, that when a
new set of facts arises it must either be included, so enlarging
the scope of the theory, or excluded, which will in itself be a
limitation or narrowing of the formula.
In determining a question of criminal jurisdiction which in-
volves more than one nation, inquiry should be directed along
two lines, first, the purpose of criminal law in the eyes of the
court before which the case is brought, and second, the extent
of positive limitations imposed by international law. If the pur-
pose of criminal law, in the eyes of the court, is not merely to
punish,18 or satisfy a desire for revenge, but rather to protect
society against further activity which is deemed to be socially
undesirable, the limitation of any country's jurisdiction over an
15 Whether it should be granted in a new case, would be largely controlled
by the balance of convenience, of expediency. Where offences are committed
within a certain distance of the boundary of two adjacent states or coun-
tries, concurrent jurisdiction is sometimes exercised. See 2 Bloom, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 244, n. a.
16 Supra note 9.
27See, Cook, op. cit. su'pra note 11, at 458, 459.
is Compare WESsTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw (1904) pt. I, c. 11, at 251:
"Mlan shoula not be prosecuted criminally in a country not his own for a
fact not committed in that country, such prosecution wanting both a ter-
ritorial base in the locality of the crime and a personal base in the nation-
ality of the accused, and involving the pretension of the state of prosecution
to regulate by penalties the behavior of persons not its subject in territory
not its own."
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alleged wrongdoer found within its territory could only be based
either on existing prohibitions of international law, or on rea-
sons of expediency.
"My conclusion then is, that while, so long as we have the
territorial organization of modern political society, the law of
a given state or country can be enforced only within its terri-
torial limits, this does not mean that the law of that state or
country cannot, except in certain exceptional cases, affect the
legal relations of persons outside its limits. As we have seen,
"law" is not a material phenomenon, which spreads out like
a light wave until it reaches the territorial boundary and then
stops. Whatever be the legal limitations upon the power of a
state or country to affect the legal relations of persons anywhere
in the world, they must be found in positive law of some kind
-be the same international law or constitutional law, and do
not inhere in the constitution of the legal universe. Whether
international law imposes limitations and if so, what they are,
can be determined only by observation." 1.9
The refusal of the majority of the court, on its failing to find
such positive prohibition in "international law," to further de-
limit criminal jurisdiction in the instant case may have the effect
of furthering a more practical and less narrowly theoretical
view of the function and purpose of allowing criminal jurisdic-
tion to a country where an international problem arises between
civilized nations. This the court was able to do by adopting the
device of here again treating the Turkish ship as part of the
territory of the country of the flag.
STIPULATIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
In view of the not infrequent practice, on the part of obligors,
of filing an answer to a suit on an obligation with the sole purpose
of delaying payment, the use of stipulations for payment of the
obligee's attorney's fees in case of suit on the obligation would
seem desirable as a means of expediting collection. Further-
more, it seems proper that the obligee should be indemnified for
such expenses, and that the defaulter should be responsible there-
for. The weight of authority allows and enforces these stipula-
tions,' although in some states they are still held void as against
19 See Cook, op. cit. supra note 11, at 484.
1 Stipulations for attorneys' fees in event of default are valid in the
following states, with certain qualifications, as noted: Alabama, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut (infra, note 13), Florida, Georgia (infra
note 13), Idaho, Illinois, Indiana (infra note 13), Iowa (infra notes 13, 22),
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana (infra
note 13), Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon (infra note
23), Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, Virginia. They are also valid in the federal courts, where
not inconsistent with state law. Infra note 15.
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public policy on the ground that they are usurious, or that they
lack consideration or are penalties.2 In general, these states will
not enforce such stipulations, even though they are valid in the
jurisdiction where the contract was made.2
These stipulations cannot validly be criticised as usuriousA
They do not increase the amount due or raise the rate of interest,
for assuming that an obligation-moral if not legal-is entered
upon with the intention of satisfying it at maturity, the stipula-
tion is inoperative. It is only when the debtor is in default that
the amount due is increased, and the attorney's fees are not com-
pensation to the creditor for his loan, as is interest, but are
re-imbursements for charges incurred by the creditor in enforc-
ing a legal right against a debtor who, by his own default, obliges
the creditor to act. Such is the usual case. The debtor is safe-
guarded against the use of such stipulations to cover usury, both
by his power to avoid them by payment at maturity, and by the
well settled interpretation given to these clauses, by which only
a reasonable indemnity is allowed the creditor5 This reasoning
also meets the argument that such stipulations are penalties.
Although, in effect, the obligor is penalized for defaulting and the
obligee's recovery augmented, the latter's net recovery is only
the amount properly due, after he has paid his attorney. Stipu-
lated attorney's fees are therefore no more penalties than are
costs. In fact, attorney's fees are considered as costs in some
jurisdictions, for their theory is not one of punishment, but of
indemnity.6  The situation is not dissimilar to that where, in
measuring damages for a money claim either on an unpaid loan
or a sale on credit, interest is allowed from the due date to
indemnify the creditor.7 Certainly the loan or other advantage
2 Such stipulations are invalid in Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and West
Virginia.
3 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 67-312; Carsey & Co. v. Swan & James, 150
Ky. 473, 150 S. W. 534 (1912); Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust
Co., 52 N. D. 209, 202 N. W. 404 (1924); Security Finance Co v. Hendrey,
189 N. C. 549, 127 S. E. 629 (1925). Contra: Westwater v. Murray, 215
Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
4 Commercial Investment Trust, Inc. v. Eskew, 126 Misc. 114, 212 N. Y.
Supp. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1925). See also Benson, Validity of Potiaion for
Payment of Attorneys' fees for Coflccti= in Note (1916) 2 VA. L. IiiE.
(w. s.) 321. Contra: Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111 N. C. 340, 16 S. E. 325
(1892); Raleigh County Bank v. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332
(1914).
5 Mechanics'-American National Bank v. Coleman, 204 Fed. 24 (C. C. A.
8th, 1913). That the amount must be reasonable is established, practically
'without exception.
6 Jones v. First National Bank of Ft. Collins, 74 Colo. 140, 219 Pac.
780 (1923). For attorney's fees as costs, see infra notes 23, 24.
7 See Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Constitutional Application of
Common Law Rules of Marketing (1925) 34 YALE Lixw JoUnNAL 480, 482.
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sought by the obligor is a good and valuable consideration for
such stipulations, even though there be other consideration in the
form of interest."
The adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law 9 has, in Vir-
ginia, been construed as breaking down the older view adverse
to these stipulations, and making them valid.10 In other states,
however, it has been held not to change any rule against such
stipulations,1' and in some instances the clause has been so
altered as to retain the view of invalidity.12 Statutes deal specifi-
cally with* attorney fee stipulations in some states." A statute
8 See Weigley v. Matson, 125 Ill. 64, 67, 16 N. -E. 881, 882 (1888).
9 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act § 2 (5): "The sum payable is a
sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be paid...
with costs of collection or attorney's fees, in case payment shall not be
made at maturity."
10 Colley v. Summers Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S. E. 906
(1916); Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 375, 378, annotation; Conway v. American
National Bank, 146 Va. 357, 131 S. E. 803 (1926). Such appears to be
the desirable view. (1912) 10 MicH. L. REV. 485.
11 Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. Ryan, 109 Ky. 240, 58 S, W.
610 (1900) ; Raleigh Co. Bank v. Poteet, supra note 4; Bank of Holly Grove
v. Sudbury, 121 Ark. 59, 180 S. W. 470 (1915). This appears to be the
prevalent and perhaps more logical view, although undesirable in that
it does not produce uniformity.
12 Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 4613: "... provided nothing herein
contained shall be construed to authorize any court to include in any
judgment any sum for attorney's fees." To the same effect, see N. C.
Cons. Stat. (1919) § 2983; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 1706.
13 A Connecticut statute provides that attorney fee stipulations shall
be valid in all instruments, but be construed as agreements for fair com-
pensation, not for any stipulated amount. Conn. Public Acts 1927, c. 171.
In Georgia, a stipulation for attorney's fees is valid only if notice of
intent to sue is given ten days prior to filing suit. Ga. Civ. Code (1926).
§ 4252. The Iowa Code fixes the amount in cases of attorney fee stipula-
tions. Iowa Code (1927) §§ 11644, 11645, 12358. Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923)
§ 67-312, provides that attorney fee stipulations in any note, bill of exchange,
bond, or mortgage shall be null and void. Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 9798,
provides that in an action to foreclose a mortgage or pledge the court will
allow reasonable attorney's fees, regardless of any stipulations. The
Dakotas hold attorney fee stipulations void. N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 7791; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) §§ 1706, 2604. Wash. Comp. Stat.
(Rem. 1922) § 475, provides that no fee shall be fixed above the amount
stipulated.
In Indiana, what appears to be an express prohibition of attorney fee
stipulations has been construed so as to be readily avoided. Ind. Ann.
Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 11359 ("Attorney fee stipulations ... depending on
any condition . . . are illegal and void."). Unless a condition is expressly
stated, none will be implied, and the phrase " if not paid promptly," has
been held not to be a condition making the stipulation void. Easley v.
Deer, 69 Ind. App. 264, 121 N. E. 542 (1919). For the Oregon statute, see
infra note 23. As to the effect on attorney fee stipulations in rent notes
of a Mississippi statute allowing landlords a lien for rent, see O'Keefe v.
McLemore, 125 Miss. 394, 87 So. 655 (1921).
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making stipulations invalid in negotiable instruments has been
held not to effect such stipulations in other obligations."
The Federal courts follow the rule of the states concerned.( '
In bankruptcy cases they may grant a reasonable attorney's fee
as a matter of procedure, regardless of the validity of stipula-
tions for such fees under state law.10 Where a note and mort-
gage or bond securing it contains a stipulation for attorney's
fees, it is immaterial which instrument contains the stipulation
as both are construed together.17 In general, a stipulation does
not make an instrument non-negotiable, even though such stipula-
tion be void by state law, in which case, of course, it should be
held to have no effect at all.'8 Under the Bankruptcy Act, requir-
ing debts provable in bankruptcy to be liquidated-a sum certain
-at the time of the petition in bankruptcy, stipulated attorney's
fees can be recovered only when the petition is filed after the
maturity of the obligation. 9
The wording of the stipulation is strictly construed, the fee
being allowed only under the conditions set out. A stipulation for
attorney's fees in a case of foreclosure, or in event of the instru-
ments being placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, are,
therefore, limited to the contingency provided for.2-
14 Snider v. Greer-Wilkinson Lumber Co., 51 Ind. App. 348, 96 N. E.
960 (1912).
15 See British and American Mortgage Co. v. Stuart, 210 Fed. 425 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1914); Mercantile Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Wilmot Road Dist.,
12 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). But see Mechanics'-American Nat.
Bank v. Coleman, supra note 5, at 28.
16 In Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451, 12 Sup. Ct. 728 (1892), the court
refused to grant the stipulated attorney's fee, following the Nebraska law,
but allowed reasonable attorney's fees as a matter of procedure in bank-
ruptcy cases.
'.Jones v. First Nat. Bank of Ft. Collins, supra note 6; Rockwell v.
Thompson, 124 Wash. 176, 213 Pac. 922 (1923); cf. American Surety Co.
v. Lauber, 22 Ind. App. 326, 53 N. E. 793 (1899) (stipulation in contract
for attorney's fee enforced in suit on bond given to secure performance).
isNote (1921) 21 COL. L. Ruv. 812; see Benson, op. cit. &upra, note 3,
at 321; L, R. A. 1916 B, 675, 677, annotation.
9 In re Ledbitter, 267 Fed. 893 (D. Ga. 1920) ; In re Gimbel, 294 Fed.
883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); In re Stamps, 300 Fed. 162 (D. Ga. 1924);
First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Stuppi, 2 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. Sth,
1924); COLLmm, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 1394.
20 Where a mortgage stipulated attorney's fees in event of foreclosure,
they could not be collected where notes were put in the hands of an
attorney for collection after maturity, but were paid before the foreclosure
suit on the mortgage they secured was actually instituted. Pool v. Thomas,
111 So. 625 (Fla. 1927). Where a mortgagor sued to enjoin foreclosure
by the mortgagee, the latter was not allowed attorney fees stipulated in
event of action on notes securing the mortgage. Middleton v. Zachary,
136 Miss. 395, 101 So. 558 (1924). But where a trust deed stipulated for
all expenses incurred in any suit concerning the debt, the plaintiff was
allowed to collect attorney's fees in suits on a mechanic's lien on property
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The danger of such stipulations operating in an oppressive
manner, as is feared by those supporting the view of their
invalidity, is largely obviated by the qualification of all such
stipulations that they be reasonable. The stipulations may pro-
vide either for a, reasonable fee or for a certain percentage,
usually 5, 10, or 15 percent, of the amount due at maturity.21
In the latter type of stipulation courts may hold the stipulation
reasonable in absence of proof to the contrary, or may disregard
the specified percent and grant a reasonable fee not exceeding the
amount stipulated. In Iowa the amount is fixed by statute.2
In Oregon a stipulation for anything but a reasonable fee is
void.2 3 The foregoing discussion, and the practice of the federal
courts of granting a reasonable attorney's fee in bankruptcy
cases, suggests that court control of attorney's fees authorized
by appropriate legislation would be desirable, fees being allowed
the successful party as costs. Such is the law in England.24
It is submitted that the use of attorney's fee clauses in obliga-
tions such as notes, bills of exchange, mortgages, bonds, leases,
and -contracts do not, under the present rules in most jurisdic-
tions, work undue hardship on the obligor. They tend to dis-
courage litigation,25 and encourage prompt payment, and their
utility in preventing groundless defenses entered to postpone
payment might well commend them to those harassed by such
procedural filibustering.
RECORDATION OF CONDITIONAL SALES
The present inquiry seeks to ascertain the extent and manner
of protection accorded to the reservation of title by a conditional
vendor in statutory or common law states. The seller's position
is considered as against the claims of the buyer and third
under the deed, in an action of ejectment, and on a suit to foreclose. Huber
v. Brown, 243 Ill. 274, 90 N. E. 748 (1909).
21 A stipulation in excess of 15% would probably be unreasonable and
construed as stipulating for only a reasonable fee.
22Supra note 13. The code provides that stipulations for a certain
amount shall be disregarded, and that fees shall be determined by a fixed
scale, 10 per cent on amounts up to two hundred dollars, 5 per cent on
amounts of two hundred to five hundred dollars, 3 per cent between five
hundred and one thousand dollars, and 1 per cent on any higher amount.
The amount is to be decreased proportionately if the claim is paid before
the return day or before judgment.
23 Or. Laws (Olsen, 1920) § 561, and cases cited.
24 26 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1914) §§ 1258, 1311.
25 It has been stated that such stipulations tend to increase litigation.
See Raleigh County Bank v. Poteet, supra note 4, at 516, 82 S. E. at
334. It seems more likely, however, that for every creditor who goes to
court to take advantage of a stipulation for a reasonable attorney's fee, a




parties claiming under the buyer such as "purchasers," chattel
mortgagees, pledgees, receivers or trustees in banlauptcy,
mechanic lienors, and the lessors, mortgagees or purchasers of
real property to which the subject matter of the sale has been
affixed.
In the majority of states recording acts have been passed. In
those jurisdictions which have no requirement of recordation
more difficulties are experienced. The differing provisions, stat-
utory and otherwise, which control conditional sales in various
states necessitate a consideration of the decisions in each state
individually. The situations outlined above have been considered
in the following statutory and common law states: California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and
Washington. The purpose of this comment is informative
purely, and no attempt is made to denote the content of the term
"conditional sale," nor to develop any hypothesis.
CALIFORNIA
Although there is no statute requiring recordation of condi-
tional sales, they have been favored by the courts and it is well
settled that, as between the parties, they will be enforced accord-
ing to the terms of the contract.1
Purchwsers-Bona fide purchasers2 or subsequent mort-
gagees 3 of the buyer are not protected against the seller unless
the court finds that because of his conduct the seller should be
"estopped." If the seller authorized the buyer to resell lie %il
not be permitted to assert his title against a purchaser in good
faith in the ordinary course of trade.4 This result is also at-
tained by statute. The fact that resale was expressly authorized
will not estop the seller if the third person had notice of the
conditional nature of the buyer's possession.0
Johnson v. Kaeser, 196 Cal. 686, 239 Pac. 324 (1925) ; Pac. Carbonator
Co. v. Haydes, 26 Cal. App. 607, 147 Pac. 988 (1915). This rule obtains
generally. See cases cited infra under sections on Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.
2 Liver v. Mills, 155 Cal. 459, 101 Pac. 299 (1909); Lundy Furniture Co.
v. White, 128 Cal. 170, 60 Pac. 759 (1900); Van Allen v. Francis, 123 Cal.
474, 56 Pac. 339 (1899); Bice v. Arnold, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 629 (1925).
3 Greene v. Carmichael, 24 Cal. App. 27, 140 Pac. 45 (1914).
4 A seller who authorizes resale may not recover from the assignee of
the buyer's vendee. In a dictu, the court said that cancellation of a pre-
existing debt as consideration for a sale will not prevent the buyer from
being an innocent purchaser. Anglo-Californian Trust Co. v. Pac. Ace.
Corp., 70 Cal. App. 41 (1924). An assignee of the seller who allows the
seller to retake and resell will be estopped. Chucovich v. San Francisco
Securities Corp., 60 Cal. App. 700, 214 Pac. 263 (1923).
5 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 1142.6 R odgers v. Bachman, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. 448 (1895); Putnam v.
Lamphier, 36 Cal. 151 (1863); Marker v. Williams, infra note 10.
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Creditors-Receivers-Trustee in Bankruptcy-The reserva-
tion of title by the seller will be held effective as against all
creditors of the buyer, whether they be judgment creditors or
not.7 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a receiver or the
trustee in bankruptcy acquires no right to possession as against
the seller.,
Fixtures-When the seller reserves title to chattels which are
affixed to the realty he will be protected against the lessor of the
buyer 9 but if the realty is subsequently sold or mortgaged to
an innocent third party the reservation of title will be ineffective
against him.10
Mechanics liens-By statute mechanics liens are expressly
authorized and may be enforced against the chattel notwith-
standing the fact that the seller reserved title in himself.1
CONNECTICUT
A Connecticut statute provides that all contracts of conditional
sale must be "acknowledged and recorded within a reasonable
7 Holt Mfg. Co. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 265, 97 Pac. 516 (1908); Iing v.
Cline, 49 Cal. App. 696, 194 Pac. 290 (1920) (an attaching creditor may be
placed in the shoes of the buyer upon tendering performance). But see
Morris v. Allen, 17 Cal. App. 684, 121 Pac. 690 (1911) (a conditional buyer
has no attachable interest).
8 Perkins v. Mettler, 126 Cal. 100 (1899); In re Farmer's Dairy Ass'n,
234 Fed. 118 (S. D. Cal. 1916). Under § 47 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy
Act as amended in 1910 (U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9631), the trustee
is vested with all the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor holding a
lien by legal or equitable proceedings. This has been construed to confer
on trustees in bankruptcy the same power to avoid conditional sales as
creditors would have had under the state law. See In re Dancy Hardware
& Furniture Co., 198 Fed. 336, 339 (D. Ala. 1912) ; In re Smith Flynn Com.
Co., 292 Fed. 465, 473 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) ; Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank,
245 U. S. 513, 519, 38 Sup. Ct. 176, 178 (1917).
9 Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal. 3 (1880) (where the seller recovered pos-
session of a boiler from the owner of the land though it was affixed "by
means of iron bolts, timber and masonry, . . . and could not be removed
without destroying the masonry and greatly damaging the timbers" of
the mill); Byron Jackson Iron Works v. Hoge, 49 Cal. App. 700, 194 Pac.
45 (1920).
10 Oakland Bank v. Cal. Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 191 Pac. 524
(1920).; Harter v. Delno, 49 Cal. App. 729, 194 Pac. 300 (1920). See also
Marker v. Williams, 39 Cal. App. 674, 179 Pac. 735 (1919), where it was
held that notice that an ice making machine, then incorporated into a hotel,
had been purchased after the hotel was built, was notice that it might be
a fixture subject to detachment as personalty, and sufficient to defeat the
claims of both purchaser and mortgagee as against the conditional seller.
- Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 3051; Davenport v. Grundy Motor
Sales Co., 28 Cal. App. 409, 152 Pac. 932 (1915). Note, however, that since
one who has a mechanic's lien, has a lien only upon the property of the
owner of the realty, he does not acquire a lien upon a chattel which is
affixed to the realty even though he had no notice of the reservation of
title. Jordan v. Myres, 126 Cal. 565, 58 Pac. 1061 (1899).
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time" 12 or else the sale "shall be held to be absolute, except as
between vendor and vendee or their personal representatives."",
Accordingly, as between buyer and seller there is no question
as to the validity of an agreement of conditional sale on the
ground that it is not recorded.V 4
Pmrchasers-If the reservation of title is not acknowledged
and recorded, a subsequent bona fide purchaser from the buyer
is entitled to protection." But if the goods were bought for
resale, the seller would probably not be protected as against a
purchaser for value from the buyer in the ordinary course of
business, even though the conditional sale was recorded;21 or
the purchaser had actual notice.17 In other situations a pur-
chaser with knowledge of the condition cannot invoke the aid of
the statute to defeat the seller's right to possessionY3
Creditors-Receiver--Trustee in Bank-ruptcy-Creditors of
the buyer are within the protection of the statute if, without
knowledge ' 9 of the seller's interest, they have attached the goods
12 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4744. Recordation without acknowledgement
is insufficient. Craig v. Uncas Paper Board Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 Atl.
673 (1926). Failure to record within two months is unreasonable. Camp
v. Thatcher Co., 75 Conn. 165, 52 Atl. 953 (1902).
The provisions of this section do not apply to household furniture, musi-
cal instruments, phonographs, phonograph supplies, radios, bicycles, or
property exempt from attachment and execution. Conn. Laws 1927, c. 153.
2 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4746.
14 See In re Wilcox & Howe Co., 70 Conn. 220, 230, 39 AtI. 163, 166
(1898).
25 MUniversal achinery Co. v. Skinner, 105 Conn. 584, 136 AtI. 468
(1927); cf. Lee v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 28 AtI. 540 (1893). No cases have
been found discussing the question as to what in the nature of value must
be given by the purchaser to come within the protection of the statute. Cf.
Universal Machinery Co. v. Skinner, supra (creditors' committee which re-
leased attachments on buyer's property in consideration of an assignment of
all his assets held a purchaser for value as against the seller).
:16 This question has apparently not been discussed under the statute.
But even prior to the adoption of statutes requiring conditional sales to
be recorded, it was recognized that a purchaser from a retailer in the or-
dinary course of trade was protected as against a conditional seller. New
Haven Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. 266 (1888) ; see Robinson Ap-
peal, 63 Conn. 290, 296, 28 AtI. 40, 41 (1893). This is in effect the rule
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 9. See cases cited infra notes 62
and 82. See 47 A. L. R. 85 (1927) annotation. But in Romeo v. Martucci,
72 Conn. 504, 45 AtL. 1 (1900), a purchaser of an entire stock in trade from
the buyer was not protected on the ground that the transaction betwecn
buyer and seller constituted a consignment and not a conditional sale.
37 See New Haven Wire Co. Cases; Robinson's Appeal, both &upra note 10.
Is Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Black, 102 Conn. 390, 128 AtI. 514 (1925).
19 Recordation of an unacknowledged conditional sale does not charge
creditors of the buyer with notice. Craig v. Uneas Paper Board Co., aupra
note 12. Knowledge of buyer's trustee before appointment is not imputed to




in the buyer's possession."0 And recordation does not always
protect the seller. Thus, an agreement of conditional sale used
to secure the payment of a past debt to the plaintiff was held
void as to creditors even though duly recorded.21
It is well settled that a receiver or trustee is not the "personal
representative" of the buyer within the meaning of the statute.22
But it is not certain whether the receiver or trustee must re-
present "lien" creditors in order to defeat the seller's claim.23
It has been held that where the seller has retaken possession
before any attachment of the goods, or before the appointment
of a receiver the latter cannot recover for the benefit of credit-
ors.24 But if the receiver or trustee is in possession, it is held
that failure of the seller to record renders the sale "absolute." 25
It seems, therefore, that in Connecticut the appointment of a
receiver or trustee is tantamount to a levy of an attachment for
this purpose. 26
Fixtures-An unrecorded conditional sale of chattels to be af-
fixed to realty is void as to a subsequent bona fide purchaser or
mortgagee of the realty.27  Failure to comply with the old gen-
eral recording statute has been held to defeat the conditional
seller's claim as against the lessor of the premises to which the
chattels conditionally sold were attached.28
Mechanic's Liens-A mechanic's lien is superior to a condi-
tional seller's right to possession even though the conditional
sale was duly recorded.29
ILLINOIS
Conditional sales were from an early date looked upon with
disfavor and accordingly it was held for many years that,
20 Cohen v. Schneider, 70 Conn. 505, 40 Aft. 455 (1898); American Clay
Machinery Co. v. N. E. Brick Co., 87 Conn. 369, 87 Atl. 731 (1913). Other-
wise, if the transaction is regarded as a consignment. Harris v. Coo, 71
Conn. 157, 41 Atl. 552 (1898) (stock in trade). Or a lease. Lambert
Hoisting Engine Co. v. Carmody, 79 Conn. 419, 65 Atl. 141 (1906).
21 Cappelletti v. Tierney, 101 Conn. 562, 126 Atl. 839 (1924). A, owing
money to B, executed an absolute bill of sale of his auto to B who, as part
of the same transaction, executed a condition bill of sale of the auto to A
for the amount of the debt. A was in continuous possession except for one
day. The transaction was deemed fraudulent as to A's creditors.
22 In re Wilcox and Howe, supra note 14; Nat'l Cash Register Co. v.
Woodbury, supra note 19; Craig v. Uncas Paper Board Co., supra note 12.
23 See supra note 8.
24 American Clay Machinery Co. v. N. E. Brick Co., supra note 20,
25 See cases cited supra note 22; In re Steinberg, 300 Fed. 881 (D. Conn.
1924).
26 See In re Steinberg, supra note 25, at 883.
27 Conn. Laws 1927, c. 277.
28 Camp v. Thatcher Co., supra note 1; 45 A. L. R. 967 (1926) anno-
tation.
29 N. B. Real Estate Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 At]. 780 (1925).
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whereas the retention of title was effective as between seller and
buyer,3' it would not be protected against innocent creditors,
mortgagees or bona fide purchasers from the buyer.31 In 1915
the Uniform Sales Act was adopted and in 1925 the Illinois Su-
preme Court in Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long:3 2 construed § 20 3 of
that act to be an express authorization of conditional sales and
held that it had therefore changed the law in that regard.
Purclw.srs-The Sherer Case held that the seller who reserved
title to a display counter to be used in a grocery store would be
protected against the claims of an innocent purchaser for value
from the buyer.3 4 What the court would hold in a contest be-
tween the seller and a purchaser from a buyer who was author-
ized to resell is a matter of conjecture only, though it was inti-
mated in the Sherer Case that the vendor might be estopped to
assert his title if he misled a third party by something more
than merely parting with possession.3
Creditors-Trustee in Bankruptcy-The conditional seller has
a right to possession as against judgment creditors of the buyer
who levy execution on the chattel. 36 In recognition of the valid-
ity now accorded conditional sales, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals held in a recent case that, even though a contract cover-
ing farm tools authorized resale by the buyer, the seller could
recover the tools from the trustee in bankruptcy of the buyerP7
Meclwmnics liens-Liens for labor or repairs are entitled to
priority over properly recorded prior chattel mortgages 3 and
30 Emerson Piano Co. v. Maund, 85 Ill. App. 453 (1898); Daniels v.
Thompson, 48 Ill. App. 393 (1892).
31 Gilbert v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 176 Ill. 288, 52 N. E. 22 (1898)
(recording under the chattel mortgage act would not protect seller against
execution creditor); Chickering N% Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N. E. 542
(1889); McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Il. 370 (1805) (one who merely ex-
tended credit protected against conditional seller); Brundage v. Camp, 21
Ill. 320 (1859); Starver Carriage Co. v. Richardson, 203 Ill. App. 620
(1916).
32 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 1211t, § 20: "Where there is a contract
to sell specific goods . . . the seller may, by the terms of the contract or
appropriation, reserve the right of possession or property in the goods
until certain conditions have been fulfilled .. .'
34 The court held that section 23 of the act prevented title passing to
the purchaser. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 1211,4, § 23: "Subject to
the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not the
owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with
the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods
than the seller had unless the seller is by his conduct precluded from deny-
ing the seller's authority to sell."
35 Supra note 32, at 434, 149 N. E. at 226.
3' Graver Bartlett Nash Co. v. Krans, 239 Ill. App. 522 (1925).
3 John Deere Plow Co. v. Hamilton, 19 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
39 Ehrlich v. Chapple, 228 fll. App. 293 (1923); cf. (1928) 37 YAE LAW
JOURNAL 527.
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it is believed that the court would also protect the lien as against
the claims of the conditional seller.
In the absence of a recording act and with so recent a change
in policy, the law on conditional sales is still in a formative stage.
MASSACHUSETTS
From very early times sales in which the seller reserved title
have been recognized and protected by the courts, and as against
the seller the buyer does not get title until he has fulfilled the
conditions.2 In general there is no necessity for recordation
before the seller's interest will be protected against the claims
of third parties, but in sales of railroad rolling stock, 40 household
furniture, 4 1 and heating apparatus 2 statutory regulations must
be complied with.
Purchasers-Although there is no requirement of recorda-
tion, the seller's reserved title is held to be superior to the claims
of bona fide purchasers 43 or subsequent mortgagees 44 of the
buyer unless the seller has by his conduct misled the third
party. 5 This protection, however, will not be accorded the
seller who expressly or impliedly authorizes the buyer to resell
and the courts have estopped him in this situation from assert-
ing his title against an innocent purchaser. 8
39 Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 404 (1808); Cottrell & Sons Co. v. Car-
ter, Rice & Co., 173 Mass. 155, 53 N. E. 375 (1899); Moors v. Drury, 186
Mass. 424, 71 N. E. 810 (1904).
40 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159, § 55. See Lorrain Steel Co. v. Norfolk
St. Ry., 187 Mass. 500 (1905), where it was held that this statute applies
only to completed cars and does not require a conditional sale of trucks,
motors, and motor equipment to be recorded.
41 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 255, § 12 (conditional sales of furniture or
other household effects must be in writing and a copy must be furnished the
vendee).
42 See infra note 49.
43 Lynn Morris Plan Co. v. Gordon, 251 Mass. 323 (1925) (purchaser of
an automobile from vendee's assignee, a dealer, not protected); Carter v.
Kingman, 103 Mass. 517 (1870); Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149 (1867)
(defendant not protected though he purchased 70,000 cigars from plain-
tiff's vendee, a dealer); Deshon v. Bigelow, 8 Gray 159 (Mass. 1857);
Blanchard v. Child, 7 Gray 155 (Mass. 1856) (purchaser at execution
sale); Sargent v. Metcalf, 5 Gray 306 (Mass. 1855); Coggill v. Hartford
& New Haven R. R., 3 Gray 545 (Mass. 1855) (seller replevies wool from
bailee of innocent purchaser from seller's vendee, a wool manufacturer).
4"Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 33 N. E. 391 (1893); Armour v.
Pecker, 123 Mass. 143 (1877) (pledgee); Benner v. Puffer, 114 Mass.
376 (1874).
45 Silver v. Roberts Garage, Inc., 240 Mass. 571 (1922).
46 Guaranty Security Corp. v. Eastern Steamship Co., 241 Mass. 120, 134
N. E. 364 (1922); Spooner v. Cummings, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 839
(1890). Contra: Burbank v. Crooker, 7 Gray 158 (Mass. 1856) (where
the vendor of a stock of goods with power in the vendee to resell, recovered
for conversion from an innocent purchaser of the whole stock). See
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Creditors-Tnutee in Bankruptcy-Creditors of the buyer
who attach or levy execution upon the property are responsible
to the seller for conversion and he may recover the chattel
in replevin from them or those who hold under them.4 7 Nor
may the trustee in bankruptcy take or hold the goods as against
the seller, even though the seller authorized resale, as long as
the reservation of title was in good faith.4
Fixtures-The seller who reserves title to personal property
which is to be affixed to the realty will be protected by statute 40
as to those fixtures expressly mentioned therein, or such as are
of the same type,5 but as to other articles so affixed his title
will not prevail as against prior mortgagees of the lands" and
subsequent mortgagees and grantees without notice.-s
Hirschorn v. Canney, supra note 43, where the sale of 70,000 cigars to a
tobacco dealer without any provision against resale was not held sufficient
to estop the seller against a bona fide purchaser.
47Treeful v. Mills, 234 Mlass. 141, 125 N. E. 183 (1919); Nichols v.
Ashton, 155 Mlass. 205, 29 N. E. 519 (1892); Hill v. Freeman, 3 Cusl 257
(Mass. 1849); Barrett v. Pritchard, 2 Pick. 512 (Mass. 1824) (where a
reservation of title to wool "before manufactured, after being manufactured,
or in any stage of manufacturing" was upheld against an attaching
creditor); Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Blass. 605 (1822).
4 8 Guaranty Security Corp. v. Reed, 299 Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924)
(the agreement between the parties was that the proceeds of the rezale
were to be appropriated to the seller). But otherwise, where the court
finds that the seller clothed the buyer with "indicia of ownership." In re
Metropolitan Motor Car Co., 299 Fed. 320 (D. Mlass. 1924). And where,
because there was no allocation of proceeds and no separation of the seller's
goods from the buyer's, the court finds the reservation of title made in bad
faith. Flanders Motor Co. v. Reed, 220 Fed. 642 (C. C. A. 1st, 1915).
49 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 184, § 13: "No conditional sale of heating
apparatus, plumbing goods, ranges, or other articles of personal property,
which are afterwards wrought into or attached to the real estate, whether
they are fixtures at common law or not, shall be valid as against any
mortgagee, purchaser or grantee of such real estate, unless not later than
ten days after the delivery thereon of such personal property a notice such
as is herein prescribed is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county
or district where the real estate lies .. ." Nichels v. Scholl, 228 Mlass. 205,
117 N. E. 34 (1917).
- No protection is given to the title of the vendor of bowling alleys as
against the lessor of the buyer. Gerlach Co. v. Noyes, 241 Mass. 69, 134
N. E. 612 (1922). The statute does not protect a seller of iron staircases
against a subsequent grantee of the realty. Babcock Davis Corp. v. Paine,
240 Mass. 438, 134 N. E. 342 (1922).
5 Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray 522 (Mlass. 1860) ; Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co.,
97 Mass. 279 (1867); Gerlach Co. v. Noyes, supra note 50, at 72, 134 N. E.
at 613. But if the mortgagee has consented to treat the property as
personalty, neither he nor his assignee can resist the conditional seller's
right to possession. Bartholomew v. Hamilton, 105 Mass. 239 (1870).
5 2 Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., supra note 51; Ridgway Stone Co. v.
Way, 141 Mass. 557, 6 N. E. 714 (1886); see Wentworth v. Woods Mach.
Co., 163 lass. 28, 32, 39 N. E. 414, 415 (1895).
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Mechanic's Liens-Liens secured by a bailee of the buyer are
protected by statute and prevail over the reserved title. It is
necessary, however, that the work be done without actual notice
of the conditional sale and that the property was delivered to the
lienor prior to the breach of any condition of the sale. 3
NEW JERSEY
For many years, statutes in New Jersey have required con-
ditional sales to be recorded in order that a reservation of title
by the seller be sustained against third parties,5 4 but the rule is
otherwise as between buyer and seller.r5
Purchasers-It is now well settled that an unrecorded con-
ditional sale is void as to a bona fide purchaser 5r from the buyer."
But it is apparently an open question as to what in the nature of
"value" must be paid by the purchaser in order to be within the
protection of the recording act. Under an earlier statute,, an
antecedent debt was held sufficient value to protect a chattel
mortgagee as against a prior unrecorded conditional sale5, It
remains to be seen whether the same result will be reached un-
der the present act.60 Where, however, a seller has "expressly
or impliedly" assented - to a resale of the goods by a buyer, it
is held that a purchaser for value from the buyer in the "or-
dinary course of business" is protected even though the condi-
tional sale is duly recorded.62 A typical transaction of this sort
53 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 255, § 35.
54 The present act is in form the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Laws
1919, c. 210, p. 461; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) §§ 182-87 to
182-118.
55 N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-90. In re B & B
Motor Sales Corp., 277 Fed. 808 (D. N. J. 1922).
56 Purchaser for this purpose includes mortgagee and pledgee. N. J.
Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-87.
57 N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-91; Gen'l Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, 101 N. J. L. 154, 127 Atl. 179 (1925) ; Halliwell
v. Finance Co., 98 N. J. L. 133, 118 Atl. 837 (1922); Nat'l Cash. Reg. Co.
v. Daly, 80 N. J. L. 39, 76 Atl. 325 (1910). The rule was otherwise in the
absence of statute. Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. L. 410, 7 Atl. 418
(1886).
58 N. J. Laws 1889, c. 421.
59 Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 57 N. J. L. 490, 31 Atl. 306 (1895).
60 The decision in the Knowles case, supra note 59, was based on the fact
that the statute in force at the time merely required that the mortgage be
"in good faith." N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-91 does
not stipulate that the purchase be "for value." But cf. Board of Education
v. Zinc, 137 Atl. 713 (N. J. 1927). See also, (1926) 36 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 564.
61 This would ordinarily be the case in the event of a sale to a dealer
in such commodities.
62 N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-95; Finance Corp. v.




is one in which an investment company finances the purchase
of automobiles by a dealer, reserving title to the automobiles by
a contract of conditional sale as security. Under such circum-
stances it seems that only a purchaser from the dealer for value
in the strict sense will be protected.63
Creditors-Receiver-Trustee in Banzkrupty-Under the
present statute, an unrecorded conditional sale is void as to any
creditor who, without notice, 4 acquires a lien by attaclunent or
levy before it is filed, unless filed within ten days after making
the conditional sale.3 Thus, although attachment occurred prior
to recordation, the seller is protected if the contract is recorded
within the ten day period.c But this period is not an absolute
limitation. In a recent case 7 it was held that a conditional bill
of sale which was not recorded within ten days but which was
in fact recorded long anterior to the issuance of a writ of at-
tachment was valid as against the attaching creditor.
An unrecorded conditional sale is valid as against a receiver
unless he represents creditors having a lien by levy or attach-
ment. The appointment of the receiver, or his tating posses-
sion of the goods does not have this effect.0 9 The same result
63 N. J. Comp. Stat., supra note 62, is apparently to be strictly construed
so that mortgagees, pledgees, or creditors of the dealer will not be protected.
See case cited supra note 62; 47 A. L. R. 35 (1927) annotation; (1922)
2 U. L. A. 16.
G6 The mere fact that on the day the writ of attachment was issued the
seller retook the goods is not notice that the sale was conditional. Brown v.
Christian, 97 N. J. L. 56, 117 Atl. 294 (1921).
65 N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-91. At common law,
seller's "title" was paramount to the claims of buyer's creditors. See
Thayer Mercantile Corp. v. First Nat'l. Bank., 98 N. J. L. 29, 32, 119 AtL
94, 95 (1922). Neither were creditors protected under the statute of 1894.
Wooley v. Geneva Wagon Co., 59 N. J. L. 278, 35 AtM 789 (1896) (attaching
creditor). By statute in 1898 an unrecorded conditional sale was void as
to "judgment" creditors. Gen'l Electric Co. v. Transit Equipment Co., 57
N. J. Eq. 460, 42 Atl. 101 (1898). The present statute protects "lien"
creditors. Morey Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 121 At]. 622 (1923); cf.
Commercial Credit Co. v. Vineis, 98 N. J. L. 376, 120 Atl. 417 (1922)
(landlord who distrained goods of tenant bought on conditional sale held
not a "lien" creditor for this purpose). On this question see 45 A. L. R.
949 (1926) annotation.
66 Huber v. Cloud, 130 At]. 562 (N. J. 1925).
167 Morey Co. v. Schaad, supra note 65; see In re Press Printers, 12 F.
(2d) 660, 666 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926), T'ev'g on this point In re Press Printers
4 F. (2d) 159 (D. N. J. 1924).
68 Koerner 'v United States Paper Co., 94 N. J. Eq. 655, 121 Atl. 338
(1923) ; Olson v. Vorhees, 292 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) ; cf. Wood v. Cox,
92 N. J. Eq. 307, 113 Atl. 501 (1921); Rapoport v. Rapoport Express Co.,
90 N. J. Eq. 519, 107 Atl. 822 (1919); Falaenau v. Reliance Steel Foundry
Co., 74 N. J. L. 325, 69 Atl. 1098 (1908) (all decided under former act
protecting "judgment"creditors).69 Koerner v. United States Paper Co., supra note 68.
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should obtain as against the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. But
under § 47 (a) (2) of the bankruptcy act.70 The same result
considered as having the status of a "lien" creditor as of the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy71 This would
require recordation prior to the filing of the petition in order
to be effective against the trustee.72 It would seem, however,
that where the trustee represents general creditors his status for
this purpose should be that of a general creditor.7 3
Fixtures-If the goods conditionally sold are so attached to
the realty as "to become a part thereof" and as not to be remov-
able without "material" injury to the realty, recordation is in-
effective to protect the seller as against anyone not consenting
to the annexation.74 But if the goods may be detached without
"material" injury to the realty, the conditional seller can pro-
tect his interest by recording the contract in the office where a
deed of the realty to which the chattels are attached is re-
corded.75 As against an owner of realty, a reservation of title
to fixtures is void unless it is duly recorded before they are
affixed.70
Mechanic's Liens-In New Jersey, as in many other states,
a mechanics lien is protected despite the fact that the chattel
70 U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9631.
71 Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50 (1915),
72 Ibid. See In re Press Printers, supra note 67, at 666.
73 In other words it would seem that § 47 (a) (2) merely means that in
those states where certain procedure must be complied with by lien creditors
who alone are protected by the local recording statute, the appointment of a
trustee in bankruptcy obviates such procedure. In In re Golden Cruller &
Doughnut Co., 6 F. (2d) 1015 (D. N. J. 1925), the conditional sale was
not recorded until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and there
were no "lien" creditors. The court avoided the issue and held for the
seller on the ground that the schedules of the petitioner stating that the
goods were bought on conditional sale were notice to the trustee of the
seller's title.
74N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-93; Olson v. Vorhees,
292 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) (conditional sale of elevator held void as
to receiver in bankruptcy of buyer). This provision did not appear in
earlier statutes.
7 Halbren v. Samuels, 1 N. J. Misc. Rep. 515 (1923). Failure to do so
invalidates the conditional sale as against "subsequent purchasers of the
realty for value without notice." N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924)
§ 182-93; Lee Co. v. Jersey City Bill Posting Co., 78 N. J. L. 150, 73 Atl.
1046 (1919); In re Savage Baking Co., 259 Fed. 976 (D. N. J. 1919)
(subsequent mortgagee); Behn v. Nat'l Bank, 65 N. J. L. 591, 48 Atl. 527
(1901) (subsequent mortgagee). Contra: Falaenau v. Reliance Steel
Foundry Co., supra note 68 (mortgage probably given prior to conditional
sale).
76 N. J. Comp. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 182-93; see 45 A. L. R.
967 (1926) annotation; of. Palmateer v. Robinson 60 N. J. L. 433, 38 Atl.
957 (1897).
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impressed with the lien was sold under a contract of conditional
sale which was duly recorded.7
NEW YORK
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was recently adopted in
New York.78 Under this statute the common law rule that a
contract of conditional sale is valid as between buyer and seller,
although not recorded, is not changed. 0
Purchaisers-The New York statutes have uniformly required
conditional sales to be recorded in order to be valid as against
subsequent "bona fide purchasers" from the buyer.so But the
statutes make no mention of whether the "purchaser" must be
a "purchaser for value" in order to be within the protection of
the recording act.81 In the present act, however, it is provided
77 Cattell v. Rhrer, 94 N. J. Eq. 292, 119 Ati. 374 (1922).
78 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2.
79 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2 (§ 62); see Rivara v. Stewart Co., 241
N. Y. 259, 265, 149 N. E. 851, 852 (1925); Van Derveer v. Canzano, 206
App. Div. 130, 200 N. Y. Supp. 563 (4th Dept. 1923); Hunt Mach. Co. v.
Stewart, 57 Hun 545, 11 N. Y. Supp. 448 (3d Dept. 1890).
SON. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2 (§ 65). The present act (§ 62) e-xpressly
defines purchasers to include pledgees and mortgagees.
With the exception of the statute in 1884 which only protected subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees, the statutes have uniformly protected subse-
quent bona fide purchasers, mortgagees, and pledgees of the buyer as
against an unrecorded conditional sale. Campbell Printing Press Mfg. Co.
v. Oltrogge, 13 Daly 247 (N. Y. 1885) (purchaser); Holley v. Motor Co.,
188 App. Div. 798, 177 N. Y. Supp. 429 (4th Dept. 1919) (purchaser);
Berner v. Kaye, 14 Misc. 1, 35 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1895) (mortgagee).
Vincinguerra v. Fagan, 57 Misc. 224, 109 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1907)
(mortgagee); Leonard v. Harris, 147 App. Div. 458, 131 N. Y. Supp. 909
(3d Dept. 1911) (pledgee).
In the absence of statute it was held that the conditional seller could
recover as against a subsequent "purchaser" from the buyer. Austin v. Dye,
46 N. Y. 500 (1871) (mortgagee); Puffer v. Reeve, 35 Hun 480 (1st Dept.
1885) (purchaser). But compare Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y. 391 (1879).
A "purchaser" with knowledge cannot invoke the aid of the statute.
Creamery Mfg. Co. v. Horton, 178 App. Div. 467, 165 N. Y. Supp. 257
(3d Dept. 1917); Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Najarian, 119 Misc. 219, 195
N. Y. Supp. 555 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
The burden of proof is on the purchaser from the buyer to show that he
is a bona fide purchaser. Berner v. Kaye, supra; Craine Silo Co. v. Alden
Bank, 218 App. Div. 263, 218 N. Y. Supp. 143 (4th Dept. 1926).
sL No cases have been found discussing the question under the present
act. It has been held, however, that a chattel mortgage given in considera-
tion of an antecedent debt was not entitled to protection as against a prior
unrecorded conditional sale. Duffus v. Howard Furnace Co., 8 App. Div.
567, 40 N. Y. Supp. 925 (4th Dept. 1896). But under § 51 of the N. L L. a
transferee in consideration of an antecedent debt is a holder for value.
First Nat'l Bank of New Haven v. Moir, 125 Misc. 722, 211 N. Y. Supp.
482 (Sup. Ct. 1925) It is doubted that the same result will be reached for
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that if the seller has "expressly or impliedly" authorized a re-
sale of the goods by the buyer, recordation is ineffective to pro-
tect a reservation of title as against "purchasers in good faith
for value and without actual knowledge" of the condition12
Creditors-Receivers-Trustee in Bankruptcy-Prior to the
amendment of 1922, creditors of the buyer were not within the
protection of recording acts.8 3 Under the present statute, 4 a
creditor of the buyer is protected, if, without notice "I of the
conditional sale, he has acquired a lien, "by attachment or levy"
before it is recorded. Consequently, it was held that an un-
recorded conditional sale was void as to the buyer's trustee in
bankruptcy, who, by virtue of § 47 (a) (2) was said to have the
status of a "lien" creditor 8  But in a recent decision by the
same court, it was held that a receiver appointed under a gen-
eral creditor's bill was not entitled to possession as against a
conditional seller, even though the conditional sale was not re-
corded, since to defeat the seller's title, the receiver must repre-
sent "lien" creditors.8 7 It would seem that the same result should
obtain in the case of the trustee in bankruptcy as to hold other-
wise is to misconstrue the meaning of § 47 (a) 2 of the bank-
ruptcy act.88
Fixtures-The provisions of the New York statute concern-
ing conditional sales of fixtures are identical with those of New
Jersey. 9 In short, a conditional seller may protect his interest
the purpose of protecting a transferee of the buyer as against an unrecorded
conditional sale.
82 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2 (§ 69). A delivery of goods to a buyer
for consumption or sale is inconsistent with continued ownership of a
seller as against a purchaser from the buyer who buys in good faith and
without actual notice of the condition and who pays full consideration.
Fitzgerald v. Fuller, 19 Hun 180 (N. Y. 1879); of. Clark v. Flynn, 120
Misc. 474, 199 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct. 1923). Under similar circum-
stances a reservation of property has been held void as to creditors of the
buyer. Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650 (N. Y. 1860); Cook v. Gross, 60
App. Div. 446, 69 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2d Dept. 1901). Contra: Cole v.
Mann, 62 N. Y. 1 (1875). But creditors of the buyer would probably not
be protected under the statute. See supra note 63.
83 Fennikoh v. Gunn, 59 App. Div. 132, 69 N. Y. Supp. 12 (2d Dept. 1901)
(execution creditor). Accordingly, it was held that an unrecorded condi-
tional sale was not void as to the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. In re
Remson Mfg. Co., 232 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
84 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2 (§ 65).
8 An unrecorded conditional sale has priority over a levy by a judgment
creditor who knew of the condition. Biederman v. Edson, 128 Misc. 455,
219 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1926).8 In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
87 Quinn v. Bancroft Jones Corp., 18 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
8s Supra, note 73.
89 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 2 (§ 67).
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by duly recording the conditional sale,0° so long as the chattels
may be detached without "material" injury to the realty."
Meclhfnic's Liens-A conditional seller cannot claim priority
over liens for labor or repairs furnished at the instance of the
buyer even though the conditional sale is duly recorded.5 2
90 Under § 67, supra note 89, although the chattels may be severed without
"material" injury to the realty, if they have been so attached as to "become
a part" of the realty a reservation of title to the chattels by contract of
conditional sale, which is not duly recorded, is void as to subesquent bona
fide purchasers and mortgagees of the realty for value. Kohler Co. v.
Brasun, 128 Mlisc. 507, 219 N. Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (purchaser);
Kirk v. Crystal, 118 App. Div. 32, 103 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dept. 1007),
aff'd. 193 N. Y. 622, 86 N. E. 1126 (1908) (purchaser) (under § G2 of
former statute); Hammond v. Carthage Sulphite Paper Co., 8 F. (2d) 33
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (mortgagee-former act); Cohoes Iron Foundry Co. v.
Glavin, 190 App. Div. 87, 179 N. Y. Supp. 357 (3d Dept. 1919) (building
loan mortgagee). Otherwise, if the chattels do not "become a part" of the
realty. Craine Silo Co. v. Alden Bank, supra note 80 (silo). Central
Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913) (gas
ranges). Chattels attached under a conditional sale duly filed are not
subject to the lien of a prior mortgage of the realty. DeBevoise v. Maple
Ave. Const. Co., 228 N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920); Fitzgibbons Boiler
Co. v. Manhasset Realty Corp., 198 N. Y. 517, 92 N. E. 1084, rcv'g 123
App. Div. 764, 110 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dept. 1908).
As against the owner of the building, recordation must occur prior to
the attachment of the goods to the realty, to protect the conditional seller.
Cf. Otis Elevator Co. v. Rochester Friendly Home, 103 Misc. 76, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (under former act).
W If the chattels have been so attached as not to be severable without
"material" injury to the realty the seller may not claim the goods as
against anyone not ex\pressly consenting to the reservation. Supra
note 89. No cases have been found applying this provision. Cf. East N. Y.
Electric Co. v. Petmaland Realty Co., 243 N. Y. 477, 154 N. E. 538 (1920)
(electric wiring) decided under the former statute. (1927) 30 Y,=L Lw
JoURnai 713. See Olsen v. Vorhees, supra note 74.
Under § 64 of the former Conditional Sales Act [N. Y. Laws 1909, c.
45] a conditional sale of fixtures was valid for the period of one year for
each filing subject to a renewal by filing within 30 days of the expiration
of the existing term. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act expressly
repealed this provision and provided a term of three years for the original
filing. N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 642, § 71. Provisions for re-filing were also
made. Failure to re-file made the conditional sale void as provided in § 07.
See supra notes 90, 91. Thus, although under the former Act creditors
were generally protected by a failure to re-file, they may not be protected
in all instances under the Uniform Act. See Crocker-Wheeler Co. v.
Genesee Recreation Co., 140 App. Div. 726, 730, 125 N. Y. Supp. 721, 725
(4th Dept. 1910) (former act). Curiously, § 64 of the former act has
since been slightly amended despite its repeal. N. Y. Laws 1925, c. 561.
If the effect of the amendment is to re-enact the former act, the interpreta-
tion of the resultant statutory conflict is a matter of conjecture. See
Cahill's N. Y. Cons. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1927) 532. Chronologically it is a
limitation of § 71 of the Uniform Act.
92Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v. O'Rourke, 117 Misc. 761, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (Mun. Ct. 1922).
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WASHINGTON
Conditional sales as between the parties are valid and enforce-
able even though the recording statute is not complied with . 3
Recordation under the statute 11 is necessary, however, before
the seller can assert his title against innocent third parties05
Purchasers-The statute protects bona fide purchasers 90 from
the buyer under an unrecorded contract,' T but it is well settled
that if the sale is properly recorded such purchasers get no
rights superior to the seller's.98  Notwithstanding recordation,
if the contract authorizes resale, or if the seller knew or should
have known that the buyer would sell or pledge the property,
he will be estopped from asserting his title against innocent mort-
gagees 99 or purchasers.200
Creditors-Receivers-Trustee in Bankruptcy-Creditors,
"whether or not they have or claim a lien" are protected against
unrecorded conditional sales by the statute, but in order to claim
this protection they must have extended credit subsequently to
the sale.-°1 The receiver 102 and the trustee in bankruptcy'" of
93 Jones v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 371, 88 Pae. 577 (1907) ; Quinn v. Parke &
Lacy Machine Co., 5 Wash. 276, 31 Pac. 866 (1892).
94 Wash. Comp. Stat. (Rem. 1922) § 3790: "That all conditional sales
of personal property, or leases thereof, containing a conditional right
to purchase, where the property is placed in the possession of the vendee,
shall be absolute as to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees,
encumbrancers and subsequent creditors, whether or not such creditors
have or claim a lien upon such property, unless within ten days after the
taking of possession by the vendee, a memorandum of such sale, stating its
terms and conditions and signed by the vendor and vendee, shall be filed
in the auditor's office of the county wherein, at the date of the vendee's
taking possession of the property, the vendee resides."
95 Eisenberg v. Nichols, 22 Wash. 70, 60 Pae. 124 (1900).
90 One who loans money to another to be used to purchase an automobile
and who subsequently takes a chattel mortgage on the car without notice
of an unrecorded conditional sale is a bona fide "encumbrancer" and pro-
tected by the statute. Worley v. Metropolitan Motor Car Co., 72 Wash. 243,
130 Pae. 107 (1913). A purchaser of property in consideration of a
pre-existing debt is protected by the statute from an unrecorded conditional
sale. Johnston v. Wood, 19 Wash. 441, 53 Pac. 707 (1898). An assignee
for the benefit of creditors is not a bona fide purchaser. Sunel v. Riggs,
93 Wash. 314, 160 Pac. 950 (1916).
97 Eisenberg v. Nichols, supra note 95.
98 State Bank v. Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 340 (1918).
99 Gen. Motors Ace. Corp. v. Land Co., 118 Wash. 593, 204 Pac. 194 (1922).
100 Gramni-Bernstein Motor Truck Co. v. Todd, 121 Wash. 145, 209 Pec.
3 (1922).
20 1 Bornstein & Sons v. Allen, 127 Wash. 314, 220 Pac. 301 (1923);
American Multigraph Sales Co. v. Jones, 58 Wash. 619, 109 Pac. 108 (1910).
102 Nat'l Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Crowl, 137 Wash. 621, 243 Pec.
840 (1926).
103 See supra note 8. In re Krache, 1 F. (2d) 606 (W. D. Wash. 1924);
Wood v. Brunswick Balke-Collender Co., 190 Fed. 935 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911);
Chilberg v. Smith, 174 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909).
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the buyer, since they represent creditors, may hold the property
only if the sale is unrecorded within the statutory period.
Fixtures-When the seller has reserved title to property to be
affixed to the realty he will be protected against the claims of
prior mortgagees of the realty if the property can be removed
without impairing the mortgagee's security as of the time it
was acquired.104 The courts seek to determine whether a mort-
gagee or an incumbrancer when he acquired his security should
have relied on the assumption that the particular part of the
building in question was a fixture or a part thereof. 0 :1 Con-
sequently actual knowledge of the conditional sale will defeat
the claims of subsequent purchasers 001 and mortgagees.'5 7 If
there is no notice, however, the seller's title will not be pro-
tected. 1,0  The effect of recordation is uncertain.i O  It is be-
lieved, however, that if properly recorded the seller's title will be
protected.
Mechaznic's Liens-In order to enforce a mechanics lien against
the property if the sale is properly recorded, it is necessary that
the lienor show that the seller expressly requested, sanctioned,
or authorized the labor-O
MODERN SURVIVAL OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
In the recent case of Read v. Dunn, 138 Atl. 210 (R. I. 1927),
the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the res-
pondent justice from proceeding upon a complaint in which the
prisoner requested the benefits of the poor debtor's oath in order
to secure his release from jail. The petitioner had recovered, in
an action of trespass against the prisoner, a judgment for dam-
ages for the death of his wife caused by the act of the prisoner in
running her down with an automobile. Following this, an exe-
cution against the body of the prisoner had been issued, resulting
in his commitment. The court held that the respondent justice
- German Savings & Loan Society v. Weber, 16 Wash. 95, 47 P"e. 224
(1896). Machines capable of being used in any building, though bolted to
the floor, are not such fixtures as pass to a prior mortgagee of the land and
factory. Cherry v. Arthur, 5 Wash. 787, 32 Pac. 744 (1893).
Los See King v. Title Trust Co., 111 Wash. 508, 518 (1920).
106 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Ellensburg, 108 Wash. 533, 185
Pac. 811 (1919).
107See King v. Title Trust Co., supra note 105, at 514.
Los King v. Title Trust Co., supra note 105; Scott v. Farnum, 55 Wash.
336, 104 Pac. 639 (1909) ; Wade v. Donan Brewing Co., 10 Wash. 284, 38
Pac. 1009 (1894).
:E- See King v. Title Trust Co., supra note 105, at 523-4, "We do not
want to be understood as intimating any opinion as to -whether or not such
a filing of the contract -would have required appellants to have noticed
it and rendered it effective as against them.'
no Wash. Comp. Stat. (Rei. 1922) § 1154. Wilcox v. Mobley, 116
Wash. 118, 198 Pac. 728 (1921).
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should be restrained by a writ of prohibition for the reason that
the action resulting in the body execution was trespass, and that
by statute I one thus committed was not privileged to take the
poor debtor's oath for six months. Had the action been trespass
on the case for negligence, the prisoner would have been privi-
leged to take the oath at once, since this action is not included
in the statute.2 The action was held to be trespass, apparently
because, in an action under the Rhode Island statute to recover
for a death caused by wrongful act, "the damages are for, and are
measured by the loss to the estate of the deceased, and because
the wrong to the estate may be considered as immediate and di-
rect, if the wrongful act causing the death was immediate and
direct."
It has been stated 3 that
"It is well known that the cases in which an execution may
issue against the body of a defendant have been very materially
diminished by statutes enacted during the present century, both
in this country and in England. Such executions may, never-
theless, issue in many cases... 4
"In one form or another prohibitions against imprisonment
for debt are found in most, if not all, of our state constitutions.5. Their manifest intent is to exempt from imprisonment the
honest debtor who is poor and in good faith unable to pay his
debts."
This construction of such constitutional provisions, or of simi-
lar statutory provisions, has been frequently adopted where there
has arisen the question of criminal imprisonment, of imprison-
ment for contempt, or of the issuance of a body execution follow-
ing a judgment in a civil action. This construction has been
approved where the validity of criminal imprisonment for the
non-payment of fines and penalties has been sustained,O where
1 R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) c. 377, § 10; c. 378, § 1.
2n re Kimball, 20 R. I. 688, 41 Atl. 230 (1898).
3 3 Fm A.N, EXECUTIONS (3d ed. 1900) 2393.
4 The author continues by saying: "The statutes on the subject are by no
means uniform. Most of them authorize an execution against the body of
the defendant whenever he has been found guilty of a fraud, or tort, or of
misconduct in office, or .in a professional employment, or of the embezzle-
ment or conversion of the plaintiff's property; and also where the defendant
is about to abscond, or where he has disposed or is about to dispose of his
property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors; and also where he has
property which he conceals and refuses to apply to the satisfaction of a
judgment against him."
5 Cf. INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (N. Y. St. Const. Convention
Comm. 1915) 759. No such prohibitions exist in the constitutions of the
following states: Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, West Virginia,6 Thus, imprisonment was permitted in the following cases for non-
payment: State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 217 Pac. 611 (1923) (costs of
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the imprisonment has followed a prosecution for fraud,- and
where it was for the attempted evasion of a license tax. By
the same interpretation, courts have held enactments to be un-
constitutional for declaring mere non-payment of money to be
a crime and permitting criminal imprisonment of an honest
debtor.9 In contempt proceedings, the same provisions have been
construed as prohibiting the imprisonment of an honest debtor
who was unable to obey a decree which ordered the payment of
sums of money.10 A similar construction has caused an execu-
prosecution); Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 87 Atl. 10SO (1913) (fine
imposed for not procuring a license to operate a motor vehicle); In re
McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 Pac. 18 (1893) (fine imposed for criminal libel);
see State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337, 350 (1854) (fine for violating a lottery act);
of. Ex parte Dig, 86 Miss. 597, 600, 38 So. 730, 731 (1905) (generally).
7Imprisonment resulted in the following cases, which admit the power
of the legislature to provide for the incarceration of employers fraudu-
lently withholding pay. In re Oswald, 76 Cal. App. 347, 244 Pac. 9,10
(1926); see Arizona Power Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 114, 116, 160 Pac. 275,
276 (1917). Or of a guest attempting to defraud a hotel. Smith v. State,
141 Ga. 482, 81 S. E. 220 (1914); State v. Sibley, 152 La. 825, 94 So. 410
(1922). Or of a debtor who gives a worthless check with intent to
defraud. Hollis v. State, 152 Ga. 182, 108 S. E. 783 (1921); State v.
Meeks, 247 Pac. 1099 (Ariz. 1926).
8 In re Diehl, 8 Cal. App. 51, 96 Pac. 98 (1908); In re Johnson, 47 Cal.
App. 465, 190 Pac. 852 (1920).
9 People v. Holder, 53 Cal. App. 45, 199 Pac. 832 (1921) (act making the
misappropriation of money by a building contractor an embezzlement
without requiring proof of fraud); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126
N. W. 914 (1910) (statute making a failure by a hotel keeper to pay an
inspection fee a misdemeanor without requiring proof of his ability to pay) ;
State v. Williams, 150 N. C. 802, 63 S. E. 949 (1909) (act making the
procurement of advances by a tenant from his landlord for making crops,
and the wilful abandonment of the same without just cause, a misdemeanor
without requiring proof of fraud); see State v. Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275,
278, 170 S. W. 56 (1914) (act making the non-payment of employees at
stated periods a misdemeanor without requiring proof of fraud); see Com-
ment (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 153, 154; of. Waldron v. Olsen, 81 N. J. L.
326, 79 Atl. 1061 (1911) (denying the power of the legislature to provide
for the attachment of a debtor for contempt without requiring proof of
fraud); State v. McCarroll, 138 La. 454,70 So. 448 (1915) (distinguishable,
due to the lack of constitutional and statutory provisions).
20 Imprisonment was prohibited in the following, where the debtor vas un-
able to obey a decree to pay alimony. Galland v. Galland, 44 Cal. 475 (1872) ;
Blake v. People, 80 Ill. 11 (1875); Peel v. Peel, 50 Iowa 521 (1879);
Steller v. Steller, 25 Mich. 159 (1872); Newhouse v. Newhoure, 14 Or. 290,
12 Pac. 422 (1886); see Hurd v. Hurd, 63 Minn. 443, 445, 6 N. W. 728,
729 (1896); Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 449, 191 N. W. 704, 707 (1922);
In re Whallon, 6 Ohio App. 80, 86 (1915) ; Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431,
440, 278 S. W. 65, 67 (1925) ; Ex parte Davis, 101 Ten. 607, 612, 111 S. W.
394, 396 (1908) ; West v. West, 126 Va. 690, 700, 101 S. E. 870, 878 (1920).
Likewise, where the debtor was unable to obey an order requiring him to
pay money due on a contract. Leonard v. State, 170 Ark. 41, 278 S. W.
654 (1926) ; Myers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 200, 189 Pae. 109 (1920).
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tion against the body of a debtor to be denied upon failure to
satisfy a judgment following a contract action,1" or upon the non-
payment of a debt arising from some form of tort action not
specifically excepted by statute from the constitutional prohibi-
tion.12 A Washington court has denied the validity of a body
execution following a judgment in any civil action, whether con-
tract or tort, where the defendant is poor and in good faith
unable to satisfy the judgment2s
A reason frequently advanced to justify imprisonment for
crime is that it is a deserved punishment for some unlawful act
or omission. A better reason is that this form of imprisonment
is of some undeterminable value in affording a deterrent,14 i. e.,
a stimulus to proper behavior in order to protect some relatively
important public interest. The interest of the prosecuting wit-
Likewise, where the debtor was unable to obey some other decree. State v.
District Court, 37 Mont. 485, 97 Pac. 841 (1908) (order requiring the
repayment of money recovered on a judgment, where the judgment was
subsequently set aside); In re Jaramillo, 8 N. M. 598, 45 Pac. 1110 (1896)
(order requiring an administrator to pay a sum due his co-administrator
upon the settlement of an estate); see State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 463,
135 Pac. 270, 276 (1913), (order requiring the support of a bastard);
Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 410, 214 S. W. 791, 795 (1919) (same).
" In re Morse, 26 Ariz. 450, 226 Pac. 537 (1924); Mass. Breweries Co.
v. Colburn, 72 N. H. 472, 57 Atl. 653 (1904); Second Nat'l Bank v. Becker,
62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N. E. 1025 (1900); of. Cowles v. Day, 30 Conn. 406
(1862); see Note (1926). 26 Con. L. REv. 1007, 1011.
12 In re Kimball, supra note 2. Specific exceptions were made by statute
in the following: Wright v. Muehlberg, 78 Colo. 461, 242 Pac. 634 (1926)
(where a body execution was issued upon a judgment in an action for
negligence consisting of a reckless or willful disregard of the rights or
safety of others); People v. Walker, 286 I1. 541, 122 N. E. 92 (1919)
(where a body execution was issued upon a judgment in a tort case where
malice was the gist of the action). See also N. Y. Cons. Laws (1923) c.
12, § 138; Parnass, Imprisonment for Civil Obligations in Illinois (1921)
15 ILL. L. REa. 559.13 Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 152 Pac. 1039 (1915), where the
prisoner was discharged after an execution had been levied against his
body, he having been unable to satisfy a judgment in an action for
seduction. The court said, supra at 281, 152 Pac. at 1045, "The reason
for the contrary rule lies in the fact that the action is not only compensa-
tory, but is vindictive and punitive, and in the nature of quasi punishment
for the violation of law. But this court early announced, and has con-
sistently adhered to the rule, that vindictive, exemplary, or punitive
damages are not recoverable in this state unless the legislature had
expressly so provided; that compensation is the fundamental principle
of the law of damages, the right to punish for crime being the prerogative
of the state." Cf. Ex parte Prader, 6 Cal. 239 (1856) (so holding, where
the action was assault and battery, under CAL. "CoNsT. of 1849, Art. 1, § 15);
see Light v. Canadian Bank, 2 Okla. 543, 551, 37 Pac. 1075, 1077 (1894).
'See also (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 439.
14 SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY (1924) c. 25.
L5 See In re Diehl and In re Johnson, both supra note 8.
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ness is always treated as of secondary importance. Viewed com-
paratively, this kind of stimulus is drastic, due to the fact that,
where the sentence consists of fine or imprisonment, inability to
pay the former is not an excuse for evading the latter. It is
often stated that the prisoner is able to "work off his fine in
prison." Thus, where there is an attempt to evade the payment
of a public tax and a subsequent failure to pay the fine imposed,5
or where there is involved a public interest in upholding "good
morals and honest dealing," 1 the act has been declared a crime
and made punishable by imprisonment. Again, this form of
stimulus is approved where the benefits of a court order or a
civil judgment would be nullified by the inequality of the indi-
viduals,17 or where some other public interest is involved.18
Where the public interest is such as to justify declaring an
act to be a crime, imprisonment is still regarded as a proper
means of securing that interest; but where the interest to be
secured is merely that of a private individual, and the public
has no interest other than that of the efficient administration
of justice between individuals, imprisonment can seldom be
justified under modern constitutions, statutes, and decisions. In
certain classes of civil cases, however, the public is still believed
to have an interest justifying imprisonment as a remedy. In
civil cases where imprisonment is permissible after a contempt
proceeding for the non-payment of alimony or for failure to
support a dependent, its stimulus protects a supposed public in-
terest in having payment made. Included in this interest is
generally that of preventing persons from becoming a public
charge.19 Here the party conducting the original suit and the
16 Clark v. State, 171 Ind. 104, 84 N. E. 984 (1908) (guest attempting
to defraud a hotel keeper); Smith v. State, supra note 7 (same); State v.
Sibley, supra note 7 (same); State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838
(1922) (giving a worthless check with intent to defraud); State v. lee L-,
supra note 7 (same); Hollis v. State, supra note 7 (same).
27 Thus, an employer would be more loath to fraudulently withhold wages
than he would be if the employee's only remedy was in a civil action, the
result of which would probably be payment followed by the dismissal of
the employee. See In re Oswald and Arizona Power Co. v. State, both
supra note 7.
38 Rich v. People, 66 Ill. 513 (1873) (non-support of a bastard); Voelkel
v. Cincinnati, 112 Ohio St. 374, 147 N. E. 754 (1925) (practicing dentistry
without a license); State v. Latham, 136 Tenn. 30, 188 S. W. 534 (1916)
(non-support of wife without good cause) ; Ruggles v. State, supra note 6;
In re McDonald, supra note 6; see Turner v. Wilson, 49 Ind. 581, 584 (1875)
(begetting a bastard) ; State v. Mlace, szlpra note 6.
19 See, for example, Miller v. Miller, 107 So. 251 (Fla. 1926); Jackson v.
Jackson, 168 Blin. 196, 209 N. W. 901 (1926); Gross v. Gross, 53 N. D.
480, 206 N. W. 793 (1925); Josey v. Josey, 114 Okla. 224, 245 Pac. 844
(1926); State v. Reese, supra note 10; Rudd v. Rudd, -uprz note 10; cf.
Commonwealth Y. Mlicheli, 154 N. E. 586 (Mlass. 1927) (where criminal
YALE LAW JOURNAL
- subsequent prosecution is often not the one to whom the im-
mediate benefits of such suit would normally accrue. 0 The in-
terest of such a beneficiary, as one who may be unable to sue
because of his minority, is thus protected by the stimulus of
this form of imprisonment, while the public interest is also being
protected. It is not as drastic a stimulus as is that of criminal
imprisonment, for, as has already been observed, 21 the constitu-
tional provisions have generally been construed as prohibiting
the imprisonment of a debtor who is in good faith unable to
obey such decrees. In this way the penurious debtor is at liberty
to earn the means of satisfying the court order. If he refuses
to attempt to do so, however, the courts will imprison him.
In civil cases where execution against the body of a defendant
is permitted, the interest of a specific individual is usually more
important than is that of the public. Where the plaintiff wishes
to force the defendant to satisfy a judgment which he refuses
to pay, although able to do so, the plaintiff is generally per-
mitted by statute to levy execution upon the goods of the de-
fendant,22 and if the goods are concealed or fraudulently trans-
ferred, upon the body.23 The public interest may be considered
sufficient to allow the plaintiff the assistance of incarceration in
order to coerce satisfaction, but it is left to the initiative of the
plaintiff to take advantage of it.24 The underlying attitude is
that the plaintiff should look out for his own interests.
The above classification of the public and private interests
protected by the stimuli which the various types of imprison-
ment afford is not complete. It indicates, however, that where
the public interest is primary, it is usually protected by criminal
imprisonment was imposed for the non-support of a bastard); Common-
wealth v. Susanek, 88 Pa. Super. Ct. 428 (1926) (same).
20Supra note 19.
21 Supra note 10.
22 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) c. 303; Del. Rev. Code (1915) c. 121, art. 6;
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 77; and see other statutes.
23 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 6142; Del. Rev. Code (1915) § 4025; 111.
Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 77, § 65; Me. Rev. Stat. (1916) c. 115, § 45; W. Va.
Code (1923) c. 50, § 40; cf. Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 5893
(making it a felony to withhold assets with intent to defraud creditors).
See also, Tatlow v. Bacon, 101 Kan. 26, 165 Pac. 835 (1917) (body execution
held valid in order to coerce defendant into disclosure and satisfaction of
the judgment); Cowles v. Day, supra note 11 (same); see Jones v. Jones,
87 Me. 117, 119, 32 AtI. 779, 780 (1895) (justifying the use of a body
execution where disclosure of the defendant's assets is sought).
24 The customary statutes provide that, upon a return of nulla bona, the
plaintiff shall first file an affidavit stating that he believes that the defendant
is concealing assets and giving the reasons for his belief; following this, the
defendant must disprove the statements of the plaintiff in an examination;
if he fails to do so, the plaintiff may levy execution upon the body of the
defendant. Some statutes also provide that if the plaintiff fails to pay
the jail board of the prisoner, the body execution will cease to run.
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imprisonment, and reciprocally, that where the interest of an
individual is primary, the customary procedure is to let the use
of imprisonment depend largely upon the initiative of that indi-
vidual. It likewise indicates what situations are generally con-
sidered as falling within or as being excepted from the consti-
tutional prohibitions of imprisonment for debt.
In several instances where the question of the applicability
of the constitutional prohibitions has arisen, decisions have been
reached by the simple process of construing a "debt" as money
which is owed and by applying the constitutional prohibitions
irrespective of the origin of the debt. The results have at times
been unusual.2  Contrasted with these, contrary decisions have
been reached by using a similarly inadequate process of logical
deduction,6 making the applicability of the constitutional prohi-
bitions turn solely upon formal definitions of the word "debt."
In the latter, the results have been in harmony with the ordinary
rules, but the analysis is not adaptable generally r The inter-
pretation of the prohibitions as being applicable only to debts
arising ex contractu, and not to those based on tort -8 is not
entirely accurate as an analysis of all situations where the vali-
dity of imprisonment is questioned, -0 and would not justify
imprisonment in such cases. It is descriptive in a general way
of the greater number of decisions, but does not adequately indi-
cate reasons or policy for determining whether imprisonment is
or is not valid in each case.
In several jurisdictions the issuance of a body execution is
permitted where the defendant fails to satisfy a judgment in
certain tort actions specified by constitutional or statutory pro-
25 Cougblin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866) (calling alimony a debt and
holding imprisonment as for contempt invalid, although the defendant was
able to satisfy the decree); In re Kinsolving, 135 Alo. App. 631, 116 S. W.
1068 (1909) (same); Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 303 (18SO) (holding a
money judgment to be a debt in all cases); Carr v. State, 106 Ala. 35
(1894) (holding invalid a statute providing that if a bank preident
received deposits knowing that the bank was failing, and did not return
them, it would be a misdemeanor) ; cf. (1923) 7 MiNx. L. RE%. 407.
26 Ex parte Phillips, 43 Nev. 368, 187 Pac. 311 (1920) (holding that an
order to pay alimony is not a debt); Fritz v. Fritz, 45 S. D. 392, 187 N. W.
719 (1922) (same).
27 This analysis -would be inapplicable where one is unable to obey a
decree ordering payment. See s.pra note 10.
28 (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 439.
29Supra note 11. See In re Diehl, supra note 8, at 54, 96 Pac. at 99;
Stiddam v. Dubose, 128 S. C. 318, 322, 121 S. E. 791 (1924). The following
constitutional provisions prohibit imprisonment for debt in any civil action,
on mesne or final process, except in cases of fraud: ARL. CONsr. Art. 2, §
16; IowA CONsT. Art. 1, § 19; NEB. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 20; OHio Co.NsT. Art.
1, § 15; see also INDEX DIrsr OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 10C. Cit. -UpPa
note 5.
6 YALE LAW JOURNAL
visions 30 as in Readt v. Dunn. The time of imprisonment is
usually limited by statute,31 but the defendant may not avoid
imprisonment on the ground that he is unable to pay. 2 It has
been stated,33 with reference to the statutory provisions of
Illinois, that
"It is true, of course, that in this state, continued incarcera-
tion is possible only where the defendant is guilty of a malicious
tort or dishonestly refuses to surrender his property for the
satisfaction of a judgment against him, or is guilty of other
fraud. It is nevertheless to be noted that execution against the
body even in such cases presents the anomaly of imposing a
criminal consequence upon a civil judgment, 4 a judgment which
may have been entered by default, a judgment based on a verdict
and on a trial of the issues wherein the charges need be proved
merely by a preponderance of the evidence, and not, as in other
cases where criminal consequences follow, beyond all reasonable
doubt. And it presents the further anomaly that a finding by ajury that the defendant was not guilty of refusal to surrender
his property or of fraud, unlike other cases wherein a defendant
is placed in jeopardy of his liberty, is not final, and there may be
an appeal."
If we assume that the defendant is poor and in good faith
unable to satisfy the judgment, other anomalies appear. The
justification of permitting imprisonment on the ground that it
will coerce the defendant to use assets within his control to pay
the debt does not exist. Again, his power of earning money with
which to pay the judgment and keep his family from becoming
a public charge is taken away during the period of imprisonment.
This would not be rebutted adequately by the theory that the
defendant might avoid imprisonment by obtaining sureties on a
bail bond, since this would merely afford the prisoner an uncer-
tain method of obtaining his release even where he was honest
and intended to work for the means with which to pay the judg-
30 Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) §§ 5963, 5964; Ill. Rev. Stat. (t921) c.
72, § 2; Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 14293; N. Y. Cons. Laws (1923) c.
12, § 138; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) §§ 2310, 2384, 2386; R. I. Gen. Laws,
supra note 1. See the following: Rusiewski v. Mickalski, 135 Mich. 530,
98 N. W. 1 (1904) (applicant not permitted to take a poor debtor's oath
where execution was levied upon his body upon non-payment of a judgment
in an action for assault and battery); Wright v. Muehlberg, supra note
12; People v. Walker, supra note 12; PAN.ASs, loc. cit. supra note 12; see
Ford, Imprisonment for Debt (1926) 25 MICH. L. Rav. 24, 34.
31 Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 5965; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 77, § 68;
Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) §§ 13617, 13618; R. I. Gen. Laws, supra note 1.
32 Colo. Comp. Laws, supra note 31; Ill. Rev. Stat., supra note 30; Mich.
Comp. Laws, supra note 31; R. 1. Gen. Laws, supra note 1; Vt. Gen. Laws
(1917) § 2397.
33 PARNASS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 571.
34 Query, whether this type of imprisonment would bar a subsequent
criminal prosecution for the same act or omission?
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ment. Where an individual's earning power is little more than
is necessary to support his family, where he may subsequently
become incapacitated through illness or accident, and where the
possibility exists that he may abscond, there are few who would
risk going surety. If the purpose of such imprisonment were
the protection of a public interest other than that of having
payment made, there is the further anomaly of leaving the
efficiency of such a stimulus largely dependant on the initiative
of an individual rather than on that of the state.
But where a defendant may not avoid imprisonment following
a body execution on the ground that he is unable to pay, it does
not necessarily mean that only those who are poor and in good
faith unable to pay are thereby imprisoned. Some debtors might
well prefer imprisonment to paying their obligations, and such a
stringent rule has the advantage of precluding debtors from
attempting to conceal their assets in the hope of successfully
undergoing an examination in connection with a poor debtor's
oath.
If the court in Read v. Dunn had seen fit to do so, it could, by
another line of reasoning, have refused to issue a writ of pro-
hibition and could have held that the prisoner was privileged to
take the poor debtor's oath. Where an injury is the result of
negligent driving, the injured party may treat it either as a
Torcible trespass or as a negligent tort for the consequences of
which an action on the case for negligence lies.2 It has been
held 3 that a plaintiff who unites in one suit causes of action
under which the defendant can be arrested and those under
which he cannot, waives the right to an execution against the
person. By a parity of reasoning, where the plaintiff can recover
against the defendant in trespass or in trespass on the case for
negligence, the court might well treat the case as being brought
in the less drastic form and allow the taking of the poor debtor's
oath to escape continued imprisonment. This would be more
nearly in harmony with modern ideas of policy as illustrated in
constitutions, statutes, and decisions, restricting imprisonment
to cases where the public interest requires it as a deterrent
against crime and to civil cases involving dishonesty or fraud
together with the wilful disobedience of a court judgment or
order.
35 KEIGWN, CommoN LAw PLEADING (1924) § 36; SAIioN, TIM LLW
OF ToRTs (6th ed. 1924) 220, n. (g); Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112
(1833); cf. KEIGWIN, CODE PLEADING (1926) § 29.
36 State v. Helms, 101 Wis. 280, 77 X. W. 194 (1898).
37 In re Kimball, supra note 2.
